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Income Inequality, Redistribution and Domestic Terrorism 
 
Tim Krieger* and Daniel Meierrieks† 
 
Abstract 
We analyze the effect of income inequality on terrorism for a sample of 113 countries between 
1984 and 2012. We provide evidence, robust to various methodological changes (e.g., the use 
of instrumental-variable approaches), that higher levels of income inequality are associated 
with more domestic terrorism. Analyzing the underlying transmission channels, we find that 
this effect is in parts due to the ill effects of income inequality on institutional outcomes (e.g., 
corruption) which in turn motivate domestic terrorism. We also investigate whether 
redistributional efforts can be effective in reducing terrorist activity. We find that countries that 
redistribute more see less domestic terrorism, in parts because redistribution improves 
institutional conditions. In light of this latter finding, we also discuss the implications of our 
analysis for policymakers who want to counter domestic terrorism through redistributive 
policies. 
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1. Introduction 
There are substantial economic and social costs associated with terrorism.1 Terrorism may not 
only destroy lives and property but may also, e.g., reduce investment (e.g., Crain and Crain, 
2006) and trade (e.g., Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004) as well as influence government spending 
in ways that impair economic activity (e.g., Gupta et al., 2004). Consequently, terrorism and 
the associated political instability may be harmful to economic growth (Gupta et al., 2004; Crain 
and Crain, 2006; Sandler and Enders, 2008). Furthermore, terrorism may have substantial 
political effects, contributing to, e.g., politico-ideological polarization and affecting election 
outcomes (e.g., Berrebi and Klor, 2008). 
To reduce terrorism and with it its socio-economic as well as political costs, it is necessary to 
understand in which social conditions terrorism is rooted. Here, influential voices have 
repeatedly related income inequality to the emergence of terrorism and violence. For instance, 
in 2013 Pope Francis stated that “until exclusion and inequality in society and between peoples 
are reversed, it will be impossible to eliminate violence […].”2 
So far, the empirical evidence on the relationship between income inequality and terrorism is 
sparse and inconclusive. Piazza (2011) finds that more income inequality is indeed associated 
with more domestic terrorism, while Enders et al. (2016) find that income inequality leads to 
more domestic and transnational terrorism before 1993 (when left-wing terrorism abounded) 
but not for the post-1993 period (when religious terrorism became more dominant).3 However, 
                                                 
1 According to Enders et al. (2011: 321), terrorism can be defined as “the premeditated use or 
threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants in order to 
obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of 
the immediate victims.” This implies that terrorism may be employed by weak, marginalized 
actors (e.g., the Brigate Rosse in Italy) but also by large organizations exercising territorial 
control in large-scale civil wars (e.g., the Sendero Luminoso in Peru) (Findley and Young, 
2012). 
2 See http://tinyurl.com/qclzcn6. 
3 Domestic terrorism refers to terrorism that only affects one country (in which the terrorist 
incident occurs and from which both perpetrators and victims hail); transnational terrorism 
means that more than one country is involved (e.g., as citizens of another country are victimized 
in an attack). 
 3 
other empirical studies that control for inequality provide little evidence that income inequality 
systematically matters to terrorism (e.g., Abadie, 2006; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., 2006; Piazza, 
2006).4 What is more, most empirical studies on the determinants of terrorism do not consider 
the influence of inequality at all. Indeed, as part of their review of 43 empirical studies on the 
determinants of terrorism, Gassebner and Luechinger (2011: 241) find that only eight of them 
consider the role of income inequality in terrorism. 
We contribute to the sparse and inconclusive literature on the nexus between inequality and 
terrorism in several ways. First, besides using more recent data, we provide a comprehensive 
empirical study of the role of inequality in terrorism, putting a special emphasis on the role of 
endogeneity in the inequality-terrorism nexus. Second, we investigate various potential 
transmission channels from income inequality to terrorism. The underlying mechanisms of the 
inequality-terrorism nexus have so far not been empirically analyzed. Third, we analyze how 
redistribution (i.e., the reduction of income inequality through taxation and other policies) 
affects terrorism. Here, we add to a small body of research (Burgoon, 2006; Krieger and 
Meierrieks, 2010) emphasizing the potentially beneficial role of functioning social welfare 
systems in reducing terrorism. Fourth, we investigate which transmission channels explain a 
potential relationship between redistribution and terrorism, also allowing us to ascertain to what 
extent redistribution may ultimately—as a policy tool—help curtailing the terrorist threat. 
To preview our empirical findings, for a sample of 113 countries for the 1984-2012 period we 
show that higher levels of income inequality result in more domestic terrorist activity. This 
effect is quantitatively substantive and holds when endogeneity is accounted for. With respect 
to the transmission channels from inequality to terrorism, our analysis suggests that income 
inequality may indirectly promote terrorism by contributing to the erosion of institutional 
quality, e.g., by undermining the rule of law. There is little evidence of indirect effects of 
inequality on terrorism via a deterioration of socio-economic conditions. As a consequence of 
these findings, we analyze whether redistribution negatively affects domestic terrorism. We 
find that countries that redistribute more see less domestic terrorism, where this effect works—
                                                 
4 This notion is mirrored by the evidence on the relationship between inequality and civil war. 
Dixon (2009: 716) reviews 46 quantitative studies on the causes of civil war and comes to the 
conclusion that there is “relative paucity of evidence for the widespread assumption that 
‘vertical’ economic inequality […] produces civil war”. 
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in parts—by ameliorating institutional grievances. In sum, our empirical analysis suggests that 
policymakers ought to take seriously the inflammatory effects of inequality. To some extent, 
they may be able to counter them through policies geared towards greater redistribution and 
income equality. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the effect of inequality on terrorism in more detail. In Section 3 we 
introduce the data to empirically study the inequality-terrorism nexus. Our main empirical 
results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 examines the impact of redistribution on domestic 
terrorism. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Income Inequality and Terrorism 
Scholars have empirically analyzed the relationship between inequality and various types of 
political violence (e.g., civil wars, riots) and social deviance (e.g., crime) since over half a 
century, with theoretical discussions of the inequality-conflict nexus going back much further 
(e.g., to Karl Marx). In this paper we focus on the inequality-terrorism relationship because—
as already discussed above—there is relatively little evidence on it, while at the same time there 
is much speculation about this relationship in the public debate. Here, we primarily aim at 
contributing to the terrorism literature by studying the inequality-terrorism relationship much 
more rigorously (e.g., by examining transmission channels). Below, we discuss the theoretical 
underpinnings of this relationship in more detail. 
2.1 Direct Linkages 
2.1.1 Relative Deprivation Theory 
A direct link between inequality and terrorism follows from the so-called relative deprivation 
theory. This theory posits that members of society evaluate their economic position relative to 
a reference group (Gurr, 1970; Yitzhaki, 1979). It argues that members of society develop 
feelings of discontent and frustration when their economic position compares unfavorably to 
this reference group (i.e., when they are relatively deprived). The theory postulates that these 
feelings matter strongly to the genesis of political violence: Inequality induces frustration, 
which provokes an aggressive response to vent one’s frustration (Muller and Weede, 1994). 
This relationship is called the “frustration-aggression mechanism” (e.g., Gurr, 1979; Muller and 
Weede, 1994). The direct link between organized political violence and the frustration due to 
relative deprivation is explicitly stated by Gurr (1970: 12-13): 
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“The primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of 
 discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in 
violent action against political objects and actors. Discontent arising from the perception 
of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective 
violence.” 
Relative deprivation theory has been used to explain diverse phenomena of social deviance, 
protest and political violence such as crime (e.g., Kawachi et al., 1999; Wilkinson and Pickett, 
2007), support for revolutions (MacCulloch, 2005), riots (e.g., Chandra and Williams Foster, 
2005) as well as civil wars and rebellions (e.g., Gurr, 1970; Muller and Weede, 1994). With 
respect to terrorism, a test of relative deprivation theory can be found in Piazza (2006). 
2.1.2 Direct Linkages: Rational-Choice Theory 
Beside the relative deprivation framework, the direct relationship between terrorism and 
income inequality can also be established using a rational-choice approach to terrorism. For 
instance, Sandler and Enders (2004: 311) argue in favor of such a perspective, where “terrorists 
[are characterized] as rational actors who maximize expected utility or net payoffs subject to 
constraints.”5 Higher levels of income inequality can be expected to influence the calculus of 
rational terrorists in ways that make terrorism more likely.6 For instance, inequality ought to 
aid terrorist mobilization by lowering terrorism’s opportunity costs, given that the likelihood to 
earn a fair income share through ordinary economic activity is comparatively smaller. 
Similarly, income inequality is expected to raise the (potential) benefits of terrorism especially 
if terrorists aim at achieving economic equity and extracting associated concessions from the 
                                                 
5 Earlier applications of rational-choice theory to the case of terrorism can be found in, e.g., 
Landes (1978) and Sandler et al. (1983). 
6 Note that rational behavior and utility maximization are not the focus of relative deprivation 
theory. For instance, with respect to the central frustration-aggression mechanism of relative 
deprivation theory, Muller and Weede (1994: 41) argue that “[d]isconent (or frustration) 
resulting from a condition of relative deprivation induces anger, which is assumed to provoke 
an aggressive response regardless of the utility of aggression” (emphasis added). In other 
words, relative deprivation theory postulates that aggression would occur even if this aggression 
produces disutility. 
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government. In other words, income inequality may make terrorism more attractive for rational 
actors who want to change the distribution of resources in society in their favor. 
2.2 Indirect Linkages 
Besides a direct relationship between inequality and terrorism, inequality may also magnify 
certain social conditions that in turn lead to terrorism, where these social conditions would then 
constitute transmission channels from inequality to terrorism. 
2.2.1 Socio-Economic Factors 
Inequality may lead to poorer socio-economic outcomes. For this study we focus on the socio-
economic conditions of education and investment. Here, a number of studies find that inequality 
negatively affects these conditions at the country-level (Thorbecke and Charumilind, 2002; 
Easterly, 2007; Neckerman and Torche, 2007; Wilkinson and Picket, 2007). For instance, 
Easterly (2007) shows that higher levels of income inequality are associated with lower 
secondary school enrollment rates, e.g., as only the richer segments of society may be able to 
afford private education. What is more, by reducing human capital accumulation (in terms of 
education), income inequality may also reduce overall economic activity (e.g., with respect to 
domestic investment). 
By depressing socio-economic development, inequality may consequently—indirectly—foster 
terrorist activity: When socio-economic conditions are poor, violence (to counter such 
grievances) may be more attractive relative to non-violence. Relating to the rational-choice 
framework introduced above, under such circumstances the opportunity costs of terrorism are 
particularly low. Indeed, some empirical studies suggest that terrorism is more likely when 
socio-economic conditions are unfavorable (e.g., Blomberg and Hess, 2008; Caruso and 
Schneider, 2011; Freytag et al., 2011; Piazza, 2011; Enders et al., 2016). 
2.2.2 Institutional Quality 
However, the evidence on the determinants of terrorism does not conclusively show that 
terrorism is rooted in poor socio-economic conditions. Rather, in their review article Krieger 
and Meierrieks (2011: 19) conclude that economic factors matter less to the genesis of terrorism 
than institutional variables, arguing that “[…] little evidence indicates that poor economic 
conditions alone cause terrorism. […] [T]he institutional order seems to trump the economic 
one.” Indeed, a number of studies suggest that sound institutions also deter terrorism (e.g., 
Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Basuchoudhary and Shughart, 2010; Choi, 2010; Gassebner and 
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Luechinger, 2011). For instance, Choi (2010) finds that terrorism is more likely in countries 
that are characterized by a deficient rule of law. 
This necessitates considering the potential indirect effect of inequality on terrorism via 
institutional quality. In the subsequent analysis, we focus on the variables corruption, the rule 
of law and human rights violations.7 Here, the argument is that inequality may produce poorer 
politico-institutional outcomes. For instance, the rich may use their unequal access to a 
country’s income distribution to buy (e.g., through political contributions) favorable legislation 
and court decisions, consequently subverting the rule of law (Glaeser et al., 2003). Evidence 
provided by, e.g., Jong-sun and Khagram (2005), Easterly (2007) and Loyaza et al. (2012) 
indeed suggests that inequality is associated with worse institutional outcomes such as more 
corruption, less economic freedom and market-friendliness, reduced government effectiveness 
and a weaker rule of law. Consequently, this opens up an additional indirect pathway from 
inequality to terrorism: Inequality leads to the erosion of institutions, which in turn creates 
grievances and opportunities conducive to terrorism. For instance, in a rational-choice 
framework a deficient rule of law—induced by income inequality—may lower the costs of 
terrorism (because counter-terrorism effectiveness is hampered) as well as its opportunity costs 
(because conflict resolution via the domestic justice system is impeded), thus swaying the 
terrorists’ calculus in ways that make terrorism a more attractive option. 
2.3 Main Hypothesis 
In sum, theory suggests that higher levels of income inequality at the country-level ought to 
lead to more terrorism.8 Inequality may—directly—lead to more terrorist activity by fueling 
                                                 
7 Institutions (in the sense of Douglass North) are stable formal and informal rules which 
constrain human behavior by affecting incentives (Voigt, 2013). It is difficult to measure these 
institutions precisely and directly (Voigt, 2013). Therefore, we follow the literature and use 
suitable proxies (such as rule of law or corruption indices) which tend to measure “institutional 
quality” or “institutional outcomes” rather than the institutions themselves (for a further 
discussion of this issue, see Voigt, 2013). 
8 In our opinion this line of reasoning is not contradictory to evidence at the individual-level 
that terrorists do not tend to be especially poor as, e.g., found by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) 
for members of Hezbollah and Palestinian suicide bombers. For one, terrorist organizations 
may be particularly interested in recruiting affluent individuals because such individuals also 
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frustration in accordance with relative deprivation theory, where terrorism serves as a means to 
voice discontent. Similarly, rational-choice theory predicts a direct effect of inequality on 
terrorism due to the former’s effect on the benefits (related to, e.g., changing the economic-
distributional status quo through violence) and opportunity costs of terrorism. Furthermore, 
inequality may—indirectly—fuel terrorism by contributing to poorer socio-economic outcomes 
and impairing institutional quality, which in turn facilitates terrorism. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
A higher level of income inequality is associated with more terrorist activity. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Method 
To test our main hypothesis on the relationship between inequality and terrorism, we collect 
annual data for a maximum of 113 countries for the 1984-2012 period. The summary statistics 
are reported in Table 1. A country list is provided in the appendix. 
—Table 1 here— 
3.1 Dependent Variables 
Our main dependent variable to indicate terrorist activity is the number of domestic terrorist 
incidents per country-year observation. We focus on domestic terrorism because it is far more 
common than transnational terrorism (Enders et al. 2011). More importantly, domestic 
terrorism ought to be more strongly swayed by local income inequality. Indeed, Piazza (2006), 
using data on transnational terrorism, does not find that inequality matters, while Piazza (2011), 
using data on domestic terrorism, finds evidence inequality promotes domestic terrorism. As a 
robustness check, we also report findings where we use an alternative dependent variable, the 
number of domestic terrorism victims per country-year observation, where victims refers to the 
number of individuals killed or injured in domestic terrorist attacks. 
                                                 
tend to be better educated, which in turn ought to raise “terrorist productivity”. Such 
considerations, however, do not matter at the country-level. For another, affluent participants 
in terrorism may be primarily inspired by economic inequality felt by their countrymen (rather 
than their own), which Krueger and Maleckova (2003: 137) call a “Robin Hood model of 
terrorism”. 
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Data on both variables is provided by Enders et al. (2011) and Gaibulloev et al. (2012). These 
authors use raw data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) first introduced in LaFree and 
Dugan (2007). Since 1970 the GTD has tracked global terrorism by examining publicly 
available sources (e.g., newspaper articles, government reports). However, the GTD does not 
differentiate between domestic and transnational terrorism. This is only done by Enders et al. 
(2011) and Gaibulloev et al. (2012), in addition to also alleviating further methodological 
problems (e.g., coding issues) associated with the GTD data. 
3.2 Inequality Data 
We measure income inequality by the Gini coefficient which reflects, as an indicator of 
“vertical” income inequality, the extent to which the income distribution between individuals 
within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. It ranges from 0 (perfect 
equality) to 100 (perfect inequality). As shown by Yitzhaki (1979), higher values of the Gini 
coefficient coincide with higher relative deprivation in a society and thus lower social 
satisfaction. What is more, using the Gini coefficient may allow us to capture the indirect 
linkages between inequality and terrorism. For instance, higher income inequality also plausibly 
coincides with greater opportunities for the rich to shape institutions in their favor, resulting in 
lower institutional quality, which may give rise to terrorism. Similarly, it is expected to coincide 
with greater economic vulnerability of those at the bottom of the income distribution, which 
may limit their options to, e.g., invest in education, consequently leading to poorer socio-
economic outcomes that subsequently incite terrorism. In sum, we believe the Gini coefficient 
to be a sound indicator to test our main hypothesis of direct and indirect effects of inequality 
on terrorism. 
The data for the Gini coefficient come from the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2009). From the SWIID we extract the Gini coefficient of net income, 
i.e., we consider the level of inequality that persists after taxes and other forms of redistribution 
are taken into account. Net-income inequality (rather than income inequality produced by the 
market-place) is the kind of inequality actually felt by society and may thus potentially instigate 
frustration and, ultimately, terrorism. 
We use the SWIID for three reasons. First, the SWIID has, in comparison to other inequality 
datasets (e.g., the Luxembourg Income Study), a greater coverage with respect to both time and 
space (Solt, 2009; Ferreira et al., 2015). Second, by means of computational procedures the 
SWIID also aims at improving the comparability of income inequality statistics between 
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countries. This standardization of inequality data allows for more consistent cross-national 
research (Solt, 2009). Third, the SWIID provides data on inequality before and after taxation 
and other forms of redistribution. This allows us to explicitly consider the influence 
redistribution has on terrorism, as we do in Section 5. 
Ferreira et al. (2015) provide a critical discussion of various cross-country datasets on income 
inequality. They argue that the SWIID’s use of imputation methods to increase its coverage and 
comparability may negatively affect the SWIID’s reliability especially when these methods are 
applied to data-poor regions (e.g., developing countries), creating a potential trade-off between 
data coverage and quality. To assess the robustness of our findings, we therefore also use an 
alternative indicator of inequality, the Theil index drawn from the University of Texas Inequality 
Project (UTIP) (for an introduction to this dataset, see Galbraith and Kum, 2005). The Theil 
index as a measure of pay inequality is calculated from industrial sector statistics provided by 
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (for more information on the 
underlying data and construction of the index, see Galbraith and Kum, 2005). As with the Gini 
coefficient, higher values of the Theil index correspond to more income inequality. While the 
coverage of the UTIP is considerably smaller than SWIID, the former does not rely on 
imputation methods and is therefore expected to be more reliable. Reassuringly, the SWIID 
Gini coefficient and the UTIP Theil index are rather strongly and positively correlated (r=0.61, 
p<0.01). 
3.3 Control Variables 
First, we consider the impact of regime type (democracy) on terrorism. We use the Polity2 score 
from the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al., 2014). The variable ranges from 0 (strongly 
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic), depending on how a country’s political system is 
organized (e.g., with respect to the openness of political competition).9 Consistent with the 
empirical evidence summarized by Chenoweth (2013: 357), we expect that “the more 
democratic a country is, the more terrorism it should experience”. Various mechanisms may 
account for a positive democracy-terrorism relationship: (i) the protection of civil liberties by 
democratic institutions compromising counter-terrorism measures (e.g., associated with the 
surveillance of potential terrorists), (ii) a free press in democracies that facilitates terrorist 
                                                 
9 We rescaled the original Polity2 score, which ranges from -10 to +10, to facilitate the 
interpretation of our findings. 
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publicity, (iii) the sensitivity of democratic publics to civilian casualties from terrorism and (iv) 
the vulnerability of democracies to mobilization and popular protest (Chenoweth, 2013). 
Another variable we control for is civil war. It is operationalized by a dummy variable equal to 
unity if a country sees more than 1,000 battle deaths from a civil war in a given year, using data 
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). As noted 
by Findley and Young (2012), terrorist activity often occurs within civil wars. We thus expect 
a positive correlation between incidences of civil war and terrorism. 
Population size is measured by a country’s (logged) number of residents, with the data coming 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank, 2014). Consistent with the very 
robust evidence from the existing literature on the determinants of terrorism (Gassebner and 
Luechinger, 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011), we expect population size to be a positive 
predictor of terrorism. For instance, the positive association between population size and 
terrorism may be due to a scale effect, where larger countries ought to exhibit more terrorism 
targets, victims and potential terrorists. 
We also consider the effect of economic development, measured by a country’s (logged) per 
capita income at constant 2005 US$.10 The data come from the WDI. Controlling for economic 
development ought to help us disentangle the effects of poverty and inequality on terrorism.11 
Poor economic conditions may create grievances that result in terrorism. For instance, Freytag 
et al. (2011) argue that lower levels of income coincide with lower opportunity costs of 
violence, making it more attractive to challenge the existing economic status quo by means of 
terrorism. 
                                                 
10 As part of our robustness analysis, we replace per capita income with an alternative measure 
of socio-economic development: life expectancy at birth; this variable is drawn from the WDI. 
One may expect this variable to be less likely to be endogenous to terrorism and more likely to 
measure absolute poverty. Using this alternative indicator does not change our empirical 
findings regarding both the effect of inequality and socio-economic development on terrorism 
reported below. 
11 Similar to us, e.g., Abadie (2006) and Piazza (2011) also use per capita income as an indicator 
of poverty. 
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Government consumption (government size) is measured by all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods and services as a share of national GDP. The data comes 
from the WDI. A larger government size may invite terrorism for the purpose of rent-capturing, 
leading to a positive correlation between government consumption and terrorism (Kurrild-
Klitgaard et al., 2006). At the same time, government size may be correlated with a 
government’s redistributive activities and thus affect our findings regarding the inequality-
terrorism nexus. 
Finally, we examine the effect of ethnic contestation on terrorism. It is measured by the (logged) 
share of the population excluded from power relative to the ethno-politically relevant 
population, where this variable is drawn from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset of Wimmer 
et al. (2009). This variable measures the risk of ethnic conflict within a country attributable to 
ethnic divisions, with a larger share of the population being excluded from power being 
expected to increase ethnic conflict risk. Previous research (Basuchoudhary and Shughart, 
2010; Piazza, 2011) has shown that ethnic tensions are positively associated with terrorism, 
e.g., because ethnic tensions create additional grievances (e.g., discrimination) conducive to 
terrorism.12 
As a robustness check, we amend our baseline model with additional variables. First, we control 
for economic growth (WDI data). Slower economic growth may promote terrorism. At the same 
time, controlling for economic growth may allow us to account for (short-run) business cycle 
effects that may also affect the income distribution. Second, we control for regime durability, 
i.e., the number of years since the most recent regime change (Polity IV Project data). We 
expect more instable regimes to be more likely to experience terrorism as, e.g., instability 
creates power vacuums that make it easier to carry out terrorism. Finally, we include a control 
for population density (WDI data). Potentially, population density correlates with resource 
                                                 
12 We use two alternative measures of ethnic conflict as part of our robustness check. First, we 
use an indicator of ethnic tensions from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (PRS 
Group, 2014). Second, we employ the share of the discriminated population (relative to the total 
population) from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset. Using these alternative indicators 
produces findings that are consistent with the results reported in the main text (results available 
upon request). 
 13 
scarcity, where conflicts over resources are expected to become more likely as population 
density increases.13 
3.4 Empirical Approach 
To examine the role of income inequality in terrorism, we run a series of negative binomial 
regressions.14 We choose this econometric method due to the count-data nature of our 
dependent variables (the number of domestic terrorist attacks and victims, respectively) which 
exhibit over-dispersion (i.e., variances larger than their respective means). When estimating the 
count-data models, we include—in addition to the controls discussed above—a set of regional 
dummies and year dummies to control for heterogeneity, autocorrelation and trending effects.15 
To further account for characteristics that are inherent in panel data, we use country-clustered 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Main Results 
The negative binomial regression results are reported in Table 2. Considering our main variable 
of interest, we find that higher levels of income inequality are associated with more domestic 
terrorism. This effect is robust to different model specifications, the use of an alternative 
                                                 
13 Additional controls (all drawn from the ICRG) we consider as robustness checks are measures 
of bureaucratic quality (to indicate state capacity), religious tensions (to indicate religious 
sources of terrorism), external conflict risk (accounting for the role of foreign policy in 
terrorism) as well as a lagged dependent variable. Adding these variables does not change our 
main findings (results available upon request). 
14 The use of alternative estimation methods (e.g., OLS, logit/probit and zero-inflated negative 
binomial models) does not affect our main finding concerning the influence of income 
inequality on terrorism (results available upon request). 
15 We include regional dummies for South and North America, Western Europe, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Middle East and Northern Africa as well as the former Soviet Union countries of 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, with the remaining Asia-Pacific countries being the reference 
group. Dropping the regional and/or time dummies from our models does not change our main 
findings. 
 14 
dependent variable and a different measure of income inequality (the Theil index). That is, the 
negative binomial regression results are in line with our main hypothesis. 
—Table 2 here— 
As reported in the appendix, our results regarding a terrorism-increasing effect of inequality 
hold when we drop the Western European countries (which tend to most strongly redistribute 
income) and/or the countries of South America (which tend to see the highest levels of income 
inequality) from the sample. Our main results are also not affected when we create sub-samples 
for the Cold War era or the post-Cold War era (given the differences in geographical 
distribution and ideological underpinnings of terrorism during these two eras). This latter result 
partially contradicts Enders et al. (2016) who report a terrorism-increasing effect of inequality 
only for the Cold War era. 
Next, we want to consider the substantive effects of inequality on terrorism. Potentially, 
statistically significant results are not practically significant. To study the substantiveness of 
the effect of inequality on terrorism, we transform the regression coefficients associated with 
the baseline model (specification (1) in Table 2) into incidence-rate ratios (IRR). The IRR 
associated with income inequality is IRR=1.074. Thus, a one-unit increase in income inequality 
(a one-percent increase in the Gini coefficient) leads, ceteris paribus, to a 7.4% increase in the 
number of domestic terrorist attacks, pointing to a moderately substantive effect of inequality 
on terrorism. 
Another way to examine the quantitative effect of inequality on terrorism is to study the 
predictive marginal effects, as presented in Figure 1. Here, we hold all covariates from 
specification (1) at their respective means (regional and time dummies are held at zero) and 
only vary the level of inequality. Again, the effect of inequality on terrorism is not only 
statistically but also practically significant. For instance, while our model predicts 
approximately 4.1 domestic terrorist incidents per country-year observation for a Gini 
coefficient of 30 (approximately one standard deviation below the sample mean for inequality), 
at a Gini coefficient of 38 (the sample mean) we predict 5.8 incidents, while at a Gini coefficient 
of 50 (approximately one standard deviation above the mean) our model predicts roughly 9.5 
domestic terrorist incidents. 
—Figure 1 here— 
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After having established that inequality is robustly associated with terrorism, we now briefly 
consider the controls. First, there is no evidence that democratic institutions are related to 
domestic terrorism.16 Second, incidences of civil war are associated with more terrorist activity, 
consistent with the notion that armed groups within a civil war may use terrorism as a strategy. 
Third, population size is a positive predictor of terrorism. For instance, this may be due to 
policing costs that increase with population size and thereby reduce counter-terrorism 
efficiency. Fourth, both per capita income17 and government consumption share no robust 
relationship with terrorism. The former finding is in line with the empirical mainstream that 
low levels of economic development (or high levels of poverty) do not matter to terrorism 
(Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 
2011). Fifth, ethnic discrimination (as indicated by the share of the excluded population relative 
to the ethno-politically relevant population) is associated with more domestic terrorism. This 
suggests that ethnic grievances also matter to terrorism, as previously found by Basuchoudhary 
and Shughart (2010). Finally, our results are robust to the inclusion of additional covariates, 
where both economic growth and regime durability are not found to influence terrorism, while 
higher levels of population density—as expected—positively correlate with domestic terrorism. 
4.2 Endogeneity 
4.2.1 Sources of Endogeneity 
Next, we want to examine whether our estimation results are affected by endogeneity. For our 
study endogeneity may have two sources. First, measurement error may play a role. As argued 
by Ferreira et al. (2015), the use of imputation methods to increase the SWIID’s coverage may 
                                                 
16 As a robustness check, we also include the square of the Polity2 score to account for 
curvilinear effects of democracy on terrorism. We indeed find evidence of an inverted U-shape 
relationship between democracy and terrorism, so that anocratic countries are more vulnerable 
to terrorism than both their fully autocratic and democratic counterparts. However, the inclusion 
of the square of the Polity2 score does not affect our main result concerning the effect of 
inequality on terrorism (results available upon request). 
17 Enders et al. (2016) argue that income levels and terrorism may be non-linearly related. To 
account for this, we include the square of GDP per capita in the baseline model as a robustness 
check. We, however, find no evidence that domestic terrorism is more likely at a middle-income 
range. In addition to that, this robustness check does not influence our main finding regarding 
the impact of income inequality on domestic terrorism (results available upon request). 
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negatively affect the SWIID’s reliability especially when such imputation methods are applied 
to data-poor regions. 
Second, endogeneity in the inequality-terrorism nexus may be due to simultaneity. That is, 
income inequality may not only affect terrorism, but terrorism may also have distributional 
consequences. For one, terrorism may affect public spending, with spending on the military and 
security usually being prioritized in times of a terrorist threat over public expenditures for 
education, health and other public services (Gupta et al., 2004). Such effects may feed through 
to the economy’s income distribution, e.g., as social welfare programs designed to reduce 
inequality are cut in favor of security spending. Also, terrorism may reduce a country’s tax base 
(e.g., by reducing economic activity through increased insecurity) and decrease the efficiency 
of its tax administration (Gupta et al., 2004). This ought to constrain the amount of resources 
available to the government for public spending on (inequality-reducing) welfare programs. 
Finally, terrorism may benefit some industrial sectors, while damaging others. For instance, 
Berrebi and Klor (2010) show that terrorism has positively contributed to the economic success 
of defence-related industries in Israel (e.g., by creating demand for security products), but has 
hurt non-defence-related industries. Again, such effects may have distributional consequences; 
for instance, wages in defence-related industries are likely to increase, while wages in other 
industries (e.g., tourism) may suffer. 
4.2.2 Empirical Approaches 
To consider endogeneity in the inequality-terrorism nexus, we employ a control-function 
negative binomial regression approach (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). As the first step of this 
approach, we regress our dependent variable (domestic terrorism) on a set of controls and the 
instrumental variable for inequality and store the error term from this regression. As the second 
step, we run a negative binomial regression of domestic terrorism on inequality, the residual 
from the first-stage regression (to control for endogeneity) and the same set of first-stage 
controls. Standard errors are bootstrapped at both regression stages. 
4.2.3 Instrumental Variables 
To account for endogeneity, we employ three different instrumental variables. Each instruments 
comes with specific advantages and disadvantages. Combining the evidence from different 
instrumental variables is nevertheless expected to allow us to provide a reasonable assessment 
as to how strongly endogeneity matters. 
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(1) Our first instrument for income inequality is simply its ten-year-lag. Such lag-approaches 
are widely used in econometric analyses. Reverse causation is less likely to matter when 
employing a ten-year lag. For instance, many terrorist organizations only survive for a few years 
(e.g., due to policing, splintering or competition with other groups); terrorist groups surviving 
for more than ten years are very rare (Young and Dugan, 2014). However, due to inertia and 
SWIID’s imputation methods such a lag-approach may not be sufficient to fully expunge 
endogeneity.18 As another disadvantage, by construction the lag-approach reduces our sample 
size considerably. 
(2) Our second instrument is the relative size of mature-aged cohorts, which refers to the size 
of the population between the ages of 40 and 59 in relation to a country’s (total working-age) 
population between the ages of 15 and 69, with the data coming from United Nations Population 
Division (2015). This instrument is proposed by Higgins and Williamson (2002) and used by, 
inter alia, Jong-sun and Khagram (2005) and Leigh (2006). Higgins and Williamson (2002) 
argue that when the mature-aged cohorts are relatively large (i.e., “fat”), this ought to lead to a 
more equal distribution of income due to more labor market competition. In the words of 
Higgins and Williamson (2002: 269): “When those fat cohorts lie in the middle of the age-
earnings curve, where life-cycle income is highest, [a] labor market glut lowers their income, 
thus tending to flatten the age-earnings curve. Earnings inequality is moderated.” Following 
this line of reasoning, we expect a negative association between relative mature-aged cohort 
size and inequality. 
However, one may argue that the inverse of a society with a relatively large mature working-
age population, i.e., a particularly young society, may produce more political violence and 
terrorism, so that the excludability restriction no longer holds. Indeed, Urdal (2006) provides 
evidence that countries with a large young-age population (relative to the total population) are 
more likely to generate terrorism due to such a youth bulge stifling economic participation for 
younger members of these societies.19 On the other hand, besides Urdal (2006) there is no 
country-level evidence suggesting that countries with younger populations produce more 
                                                 
18 We thank a referee for raising these points. 
19 However, Urdal (2006: 614) also notes that his terrorism data is of inferior quality, 
consequently calling for a “cautious interpretations of [his] results” concerning the effect of 
youth bulges on terrorism. 
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terrorism. Rather, Gassebner and Luechinger (2011: 254) in their review of 43 terrorism studies 
come to the conclusion that “citizens from countries with a large share of young people are less 
likely to be victimized and, importantly, not more likely to commit attacks. Especially the latter 
result contradicts the literature on ‘youth bulge’.” This would suggest that the exclusion 
restriction is valid after all. 
(3) Our final instrument is the value added in agriculture (as share of GDP) collected by the 
Statistics Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.20 This 
measure reflects a country’s economic structure, where higher values indicate that it is more 
strongly dominated by agriculture. We expect a negative association between the relative 
importance of agriculture in a country’s economy and its level of income inequality. For 
instance, Kuznets (1955) argues that agrarian economies see less inequality than their 
industrialized counterparts primarily because processes accompanying industrialization (e.g., 
the inflow of “surplus labor” from rural areas into the cities) tend to disproportionately benefit 
only some (small) segments of society (e.g., the “industrialists”).21 At the same time, we do not 
expect the value added in agriculture to predict domestic terrorism. For one, there are no 
theoretical or empirical studies that link the relative importance of agriculture in a country’s 
economy to the emergence of terrorism. What is more, there is a very low correlation between 
the two variables (r=-0.02, p=0.37).22 Consequently, we expect terrorism to be affected by the 
value added in agriculture only through the latter’s effect on income inequality. 
4.2.4 Instrumental-Variables Results 
                                                 
20 The database can be accessed at http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/. 
21 Kuznets (1955) predicts that strongly industrialized countries would see inequality decrease 
again when the gains from industrialization are eventually “democratized” (e.g., through a 
welfare system). However, empirical research provides little support for the “Kuznets curve” 
(e.g., Deininger and Squire, 1998). This is also true for our sample. That is, we find that the 
value added in agriculture negatively predicts income inequality (as it is expected and necessary 
for identification) but that there is no evidence of a curvilinear relationship (results available 
upon request). 
22 A multivariate negative binomial regression using our usual controls also does not show that 
the value added in agriculture is a significant predictor of domestic terrorism (results available 
upon request). 
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The findings of the regressions accounting for endogeneity (Table 3) can be summarized as 
follows. First, and most importantly, income inequality remains a robust predictor of terrorism 
when we account for endogeneity regardless of which instrumental variable we employ.23 Here, 
an examination of the first-stage regression results (via an F-test statistic on the excluded 
instruments in the first-stage regression) suggests that the employed instruments are not weak.24 
Third, while the inclusion of the first-stage residuals appears to be meaningful in some 
specifications (suggesting the presence of endogeneity), the IV- and non-IV estimates are not 
significantly different from each other (so that confidence intervals overlap). In other words, 
endogeneity does not matter strongly and the bias due to endogeneity appears to be benign. If 
anything, our IV-estimates suggests that the original estimates exhibit a downward bias, as 
shown by the non-IV-estimates also reported in Table 3 using samples identical to their 
respective IV-counterparts. Considering our main results, this suggests that the estimated 
effects of inequality on terrorism reported in Table 2 are rather conservative. 
—Table 3 here— 
4.3 Transmission Channels 
So far, our empirical analysis has provided evidence that inequality is conducive to domestic 
terrorism. In this subsection we study which transmission channels may explain this 
association. As discussed in Section 2, inequality may induce terrorism by negatively affecting 
institutional quality as well as socio-economic conditions. 
(1) To account for the indirect effect of inequality on domestic terrorism via poorer institutional 
outcomes, we consider the channels of the rule of law, corruption and physical integrity rights 
                                                 
23 As a robustness check, we also run a series of IV-regressions using the Theil index as a 
measure of income inequality. We find that inequality measured by the Theil index is positively 
associated with terrorism when instrumenting it with relative mature-cohort size or value added 
in agriculture (we do not use the ten-year lag-approach due to its effect on sample size). The 
results of these robustness checks are available upon request. 
24 The first-stage regression results can be found in the appendix (Supplementary Table 2). Note 
that when we use the relative size of mature-aged cohorts as an instrument, we do not consider 
regional and time effects. This is because the instrument becomes too weak (as indicated by the 
associated F-test statistic going below 10) when these additional dummies are included. 
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(human rights). The first two variables are from the ICRG, while the latter is from Cingranelli 
et al. (2014). 
(2) We scrutinize whether inequality indirectly affects terrorism through its effect on socio-
economic development by considering two variables accounting for domestic investment 
(measured by per capita fixed capital formation) and education (gross tertiary school 
enrollment). These variables are drawn from the WDI.  
To examine which institutional and/or socio-economic indicators explain (parts of) the effect 
of income inequality on terrorism, we proceed as follows. First, we regress the potential 
transmission variables on income inequality (plus the usual controls listed in Section 3.3) via 
OLS. Second, we run the same set of regressions using an IV-OLS approach to account for 
endogeneity, where inequality is instrumented by relative mature-cohort size and value added 
in agriculture. Here, we also report diagnostic statistics on instrument weakness (the first-stage 
F-statistics) and overidentifying restrictions (Hansen’s J-statistic) to assess the validity of the 
IV-approach. Finally, we regress the number of domestic terrorist incidents on income 
inequality, the potential transmission variables and the usual controls, employing the negative 
binomial maximum-likelihood estimator. Finding that (i) income inequality affects a 
transmission variable in a statistically significant way and (ii) this transmission variable in turn 
similarly influences domestic terrorism (net of the influence of income inequality) would 
suggest that (iii) the effect of income inequality on terrorism is (partly) transmitted via the 
respective transmission channel. 
Our empirical results due to the aforementioned empirical efforts are reported in Table 4. First, 
we find that income inequality negatively affects measures of governance and institutional 
quality. More income inequality results in a weaker rule of law, more corruption and a poorer 
human rights situation. Importantly, these findings also hold when an IV-OLS approach is used, 
where the used instruments appear to be valid. Our results thus reinforce earlier findings by 
Glaeser et al. (2003) and Landman and Larizza (2009) who find that income inequality 
undermines the quality of institutions. Second, we find that poor institutional quality in turn 
results in more domestic terrorism, mirroring earlier findings by, e.g., Choi (2010) and Walsh 
and Piazza (2010). Taken together, these findings suggest that the unfavorable effect of income 
inequality on institutional outcomes partially explains the positive association between income 
inequality and domestic terrorism. Finally, the total effect of inequality on terrorism is only 
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partially transmitted by its unfavorable effect on institutional outcomes.25 For one, this may 
suggest that further transmitters not considered in our analysis may play a role. For another, 
this may indicate that there is also a direct effect of inequality on domestic terrorism. This latter 
interpretation would be in line with relative deprivation theory suggesting that terrorism (as a 
form of aggression) is also used as a means to vent anger frustration stemming from relative 
deprivation. 
Considering the socio-economic channels, our findings suggest that no comparable 
transmission occurs. For one, the influence of inequality on education is not robust, given that 
the over-identification restrictions associated with the IV-approach are not valid. Furthermore, 
income inequality does not affect domestic investment. While domestic investment negatively 
determines domestic terrorism (a similar result is reported in Freytag et al., 2011), this effect is 
not related to any transmission effect (because inequality does not determine investment). 
Education does not influence domestic terrorism, so a transmission from inequality to terrorism 
via education cannot possibly be present.  
—Table 4 here— 
As a robustness check, we also run a classical mediation analysis (following the Baron-Kenny 
approach) as outlined in, e.g., Wu and Zumbo (2008). The results of this analysis are reported 
in the appendix (Supplementary Table 3). They also suggest that the total effect of inequality 
on domestic terrorism is partly due to the indirect ill effects of inequality on institutional quality 
(but not due to socio-economic effects), mirroring the results of Table 4. However, we do not 
want to overemphasize the mediation analysis findings, given the well-known weaknesses of 
classical mediation analyses with observational data (e.g., Imai et al., 2011); in particular, the 
findings should only be cautiously interpreted as being suggestive of underlying mechanisms 
rather than as being of a causal nature.26 
 
5. The Role of Redistribution 
In the light of our findings, how can the inflammatory effects of income inequality on terrorism 
be alleviated? Redistribution appears to be a powerful policy tool. The reduction of income 
                                                 
25 This is because income inequality still exerts a positive effect on domestic terrorism even 
when the relevant transmission channels are accounted for. 
26 We thank a referee for raising this point. 
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inequality through taxation and welfare policies ought to reduce grievances and frustration due 
to inequality that may otherwise result in terrorism. 
5.1 Measuring Redistribution 
To study the role of redistribution in the inequality-terrorism nexus, we extract another variable 
from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database: the Gini coefficient based on gross 
income, i.e., before taxes and other forms of redistribution are considered. This Gini coefficient 
thus reflects the income inequality at the market-level. We divide the Gini coefficient at the 
market-level (before taxation and redistribution can have an effect) by the Gini coefficient at 
the net-income level (after taxation and redistribution are accounted for); note that the Gini 
coefficient at the net-income level is the inequality indicator we used for all previous empirical 
efforts. The result of this division is a new variable we call redistribution. A higher value of 
this variable corresponds to stronger redistribution, which may be achieved by, e.g., more 
progressive taxation or transfer payment programs that benefit segments of society at the 
bottom of the income distribution (Solt, 2009). 
5.2 Redistribution and Domestic Terrorism 
In Table 5 we present negative binomial regression results employing the redistribution 
indicator as our main explanatory variable. The results indicate that higher levels of 
redistribution are associated with less domestic terrorist incidents (but not fewer victims from 
domestic terrorism). With respect to the controls, the results are virtually identical to the ones 
reported in Table 2, meaning that domestic terrorism is more likely to occur during times of 
civil war and in more populated (and densely populated) countries plagued by ethnic divisions, 
while further economic and political variables (democracy, per capita income, government 
consumption, economic growth, regime durability) are not consistently found to matter. 
—Table 5 here— 
Next, we want to consider the substantive effect of redistribution on terrorism. First, the IRR 
associated with the redistribution variable is IRR=0.147 (specification 1, Table 5). That is, a 
one-unit increase in the redistribution variable is, ceteris paribus, associated with an 85.3% 
decrease in terrorism. Second, the predictive marginal effects of redistribution on terrorism are 
plotted in Figure 2, where the remaining covariates are held at their mean (regional and time 
dummies are held at zero) and only the values of the redistribution variable varies. This analysis 
also shows that the effect of redistribution on terrorism is of practical significance. While our 
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model predicts approximately 9.1 domestic terrorist attacks per year and country when the 
redistribution variable is equal to unity (meaning that inequality is identical before and after 
redistribution), we only predict approximately 3.7 domestic terrorist incidents when the 
redistribution variable is equal to 1.5 (meaning that inequality is reduced to 33% of its initial 
value through redistribution). Similarly, we only predict 5.8 domestic terrorist incidents when 
redistribution is equal to 1.25, the sample mean. 
—Figure 2 here— 
In sum, these findings suggest that countries may be able to substantially reduce their terrorism 
risk through redistributive policies. To give an illustrative example, in our sample Canada was 
able to (on average) reduce income inequality by one third, moving from an average pre-
redistribution Gini coefficient of 45.5 to a post-redistribution Gini coefficient of approximately 
30. The country experienced a total of 24 terrorist incidents between 1984 and 2012. A country 
with similar economic, demographic and political characteristics where redistribution was 
almost absent is Argentina. Its average market-level Gini coefficient of 45 was only reduced to 
a net Gini coefficient of 42.5. Between 1984 and 2012 the country saw almost 300 terrorist 
incidents. 
5.3 Transmission Channels 
Finally, we want to consider through which transmission channels redistribution reduces 
terrorism. Methodologically, we proceed similar to Section 4.3 by first estimating the effect of 
redistribution on the various transmission channels and then estimating the effect of the 
transmission variables on domestic terrorism (net of the influence of redistribution). The 
corresponding results are reported in Table 6.27 
—Table 6 here— 
First, redistribution is associated with better institutional quality, i.e. lower levels of corruption, 
a stronger rule of law and greater respect for human rights. These institutional improvements 
are in turn found to correlate negatively with terrorism. Taken together with our previous 
findings, this suggests that redistribution may cancel out the ill effects of income inequality on 
institutional quality. Second, while education is not found to matter, we find some evidence 
                                                 
27 The results from a classical mediation analysis (reported in Supplementary Table 4) we 
conduct as a robustness check are also in line with the results reported below. 
 24 
that redistribution is negatively related to domestic investment. This finding is consistent with 
macroeconomic theory suggesting that savings increase with income. As savings will be 
converted into investment, more inequality ought to result in more capital accumulation; a 
higher level of capital accumulation in turn constitutes an important engine of economic growth 
(Weil, 2013: 380-381). Thus, by depressing domestic investment redistribution may also have 
an unfavorable effect on domestic terrorism, partially cancelling out its beneficial effect on 
institutional conditions. 
In general, the latter finding suggests that the role of redistribution in terrorism may not merely 
be a mirror image of the effect of income inequality on terrorism. Rather, further consequences 
of redistribution need to be taken into account. For instance, besides affecting investment, 
redistribution also tends to coincide with high taxation and potentially excessive public 
spending, which may be harmful to a country’s economic life—and thus potentially conducive 
to terrorism—by, e.g., introducing inefficiencies and crowding out private economic activity 
(Scully, 2002). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using data for a maximum of 113 countries between 1984 and 2012, we empirically assess 
whether income inequality is linked to terrorism. Our results indicate that higher levels of 
income inequality are associated with more domestic terrorist activity; the estimated effects are 
also economically substantive. Moreover, this main finding holds when endogeneity is 
accounted for. Considering the related transmission channels, we show that income inequality 
indirectly leads to terrorism by causing an erosion of institutional quality (corruption, the rule 
of law, human rights), while there is little evidence of indirect effects of inequality on terrorism 
via a deterioration of socio-economic conditions. 
With respect to public policy, our findings suggest that policymakers may reduce domestic 
terrorism by keeping inequality in check. As evidenced by our study, redistributional efforts 
(which ameliorate income inequality created at the market-place) can indeed be effective in 
reducing inequality and, consequently, terrorist activity. We find that this latter effect works—
in parts—by ameliorating institutional grievances (e.g., as redistribution strengthens the rule of 
law). However, policymakers have to recognize that redistribution does not merely cancel out 
the ill effects of income inequality but entails further, potentially unfavorable, consequences. 
For instance, redistribution may potentially coincide with high taxation and inefficiently large 
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public sectors. This may consequently not only crowd-out and disincentivize private economic 
activity but also create (new) discrete reasons for terrorist violence (e.g., anti-tax violence). 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank Arun Agrawal and two anonymous referees for their helpful 
and valuable comments. They also want to thank the participants of the 2016 Jan Tinbergen 
Conference in Milan for their insightful comments on earlier version of this paper. 
 
References 
Abadie, A. (2006). Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism. American Economic 
Review 96, 50-56. 
Basuchoudhary, A., Shughart, W.F. (2010). On ethnic conflict and the origins of transnational 
terrorism. Defence and Peace Economics 21, 65-87. 
Berrebi, C., Klor, E.F. (2008). Are voters sensitive to terrorism? Direct evidence from the Israeli 
electorate. American Political Science Review 102, 279-301. 
Berrebi, C., Klor, E.F. (2010). The impact of terrorism on the defence industry. Economica 77, 
518-543. 
Blomberg, S.B., Hess, G.D. (2008). The lexus and the olive branch: Globalization, 
democratisation and terrorism. In: Keefer, P., Loayza, N. (Eds), Terrorism, Economic 
Development, and Political Openness. Cambridge University Press: New York, NY, pp. 
116-147. 
Burgoon, B. (2006). On welfare and terror: Social welfare policies and political-economic roots 
of terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, 176-203. 
Cameron, A.C., Trivedi, P.K. (2013). Regression Analysis of Count Data. Cambridge 
University Press: New York. 
Caruso, R., Schneider, F. (2011). The socio-economic determinants of terrorism and political 
violence in Western Europe (1994–2007). European Journal of Political Economy 27, 37-
49. 
Chandra, S., Williams Foster, A. (2005). The “revolution of rising expectations,” relative 
deprivation, and the urban social disorders of the 1960s: Evidence from state-level data. 
Social Science History 29, 299-332. 
Chenoweth, E. (2013). Terrorism and democracy. Annual Review of Political Science 16, 355-
378. 
 26 
Choi, S.-W. (2010). Fighting terrorism through the rule of law? Journal of Conflict Resolution 
54, 940-966. 
Cingranelli, D.L., Richards, D.L., Clay, K.C. (2014). The CIRI Human Rights Dataset. 
Available at http://www.humanrightsdata.com. 
Crain, N.V., Crain, W.M. (2006). Terrorized economies. Public Choice 128, 317-349. 
Deininger, K., Squire, L. (1998). New ways of looking at old issues: Inequality and growth. 
Journal of Development Economics 57, 259-287. 
Dixon, J. (2009). What causes civil wars? Integrating quantitative research findings. 
International Studies Review 11, 707-735. 
Easterly, W. (2007). Inequality does cause underdevelopment: Insights from a new instrument. 
Journal of Development Economics 84, 755-776. 
Enders, W., Hoover, G.A., Sandler, T. (2016). The changing nonlinear relationship between 
income and terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, 195-225. 
Enders, W., Sandler, T., Gaibulloev, K. (2011). Domestic versus transnational terrorism: Data, 
decomposition, and dynamics. Journal of Peace Research 48, 319-337. 
Ferreira, F.H.G, Lustig, N., Teles, D. (2015). Appraising cross-national income inequality 
databases: An introduction. Journal of Economic Inequality 13, 497-526. 
Findley, M.G., Young, J.K. (2012). Terrorism and civil war: A spatial and temporal approach 
to a conceptual problem. Perspectives on Politics 10, 285-305. 
Freytag, A., Krüger, J.J., Meierrieks, D., Schneider, F. (2011). The origins of terrorism: Cross-
country estimates of socio-economic determinants of terrorism. European Journal of 
Political Economy 27, 5-16. 
Gaibulloev, K., Sandler, T., Santifort, C. (2012). Assessing the evolving threat of terrorism. 
Global Policy 3, 135-144. 
Galbraith, J.K, Kum, H. (2005). Estimating the inequality of household incomes: A statistical 
approach to the creation of a dense and consistent global data set. Review of Income and 
Wealth 51, 115-143. 
Gassebner, M., Luechinger, S. (2011). Lock, stock, and barrel: A comprehensive assessment of 
the determinants of terror. Public Choice 149, 235-261. 
Glaeser, E, Scheinkman, J., Shleifer, A. (2003). The injustice of inequality. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 50, 199-222. 
Gupta, S., Clements, B., Bhattacharya, R., Chakravarti, S. (2004). Fiscal consequences of 
armed conflict and terrorism in low- and middle-income countries. European Journal of 
Political Economy 20, 403-421. 
 27 
Gurr, T.R. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. 
Higgins, M., Williamson, J.G. (2002). Explaining inequality the world round: Cohort size, 
Kuznets curves, and openness. Southeast Asian Studies 40, 268-302. 
Imai, K., Keele, L., Tingley, D., Yamamoto, T. (2011). Unpacking the black box of causality: 
Learning about causal mechanisms from experimental and observational studies. American 
Political Science Review 105, 765-789. 
Jong-sun, Y., Khagram, S. (2005). A comparative study of inequality and corruption. American 
Sociological Review 70, 136-157. 
Kawachi, I. Kennedy, B.P., Wilkinson, R.G. (1999). Crime: Social disorganization and relative 
deprivation. Social Science & Medicine 48, 719-731. 
Krieger. T., Meierrieks, D. (2010). Terrorism in the worlds of welfare capitalism. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 54, 902-939. 
Krieger, T., Meierrieks, D. (2011). What causes terrorism? Public Choice 147, 3-27. 
Krueger, A.B., Maleckova, J. (2003). Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal 
connection? Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 119-144. 
Kurrild-Klitgaard, P., Justesen, M.K., Klemmensen, R. (2006). The political economy of 
freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism. Public Choice 128, 289-315. 
Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic growth and income inequality. American Economic Review 45, 
1-28 
LaFree, G., Dugan, L. (2007). Introducing the Global Terrorism Database. Terrorism and 
Political Violence 19, 181-204. 
Landes, W.M. (1978). An economic study of U. S. aircraft hijacking, 1961-1976. Journal of 
Law and Economics 21, 1-31. 
Landman, T., Larizza, M. (2009). Inequality and human rights: Who controls what, when, and 
how. International Studies Quarterly 53, 715-736. 
Leigh, A. (2006). Does equality lead to fraternity? Economics Letters 93, 121-125. 
Loayza, N., Rigolini, J., Llorente, G. (2012). Do middle classes bring about institutional 
reforms? Economics Letters 116, 440-444. 
MacCulloch, R. (2005). Income inequality and the taste for revolution. Journal of Law and 
Economics 48, 93-123. 
Marshall, M.G, Gurr, T.G., Jaggers, K. (2013). Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013. Center for Systemic Peace: Vienna, VA. 
Muller, E.N., Weede, E. (1994). Theories of rebellion: Relative deprivation and power 
contention. Rationality and Society 6, 40-57. 
 28 
Neckerman, K.M., Torche, F. (2007). Inequality: Causes and consequences. Annual Review of 
Sociology 33, 335-357. 
Nitsch, V., Schumacher, D. (2004). Terrorism and international trade: An empirical 
investigation. European Journal of Political Economy 20, 423-433. 
Piazza, J.A. (2006). Rooted in poverty? Terrorism, poor economic development, and social 
cleavages. Terrorism and Political Violence 18, 159-177. 
Piazza, J.A. (2011). Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism. 
Journal of Peace Research 48, 339-353. 
Pettersson, T., Wallensteen, P. (2015). Armed conflicts, 1946-2014. Journal of Peace Research 
52, 536-550. 
PRS Group (2014). International Country Risk Guide. The PRS Group, Inc.: Syracuse, NY. 
Sandler, T., Enders, W. (2004). An economic perspective on transnational terrorism. European 
Journal of Political Economy 20, 301-316. 
Sandler, T., Enders, W. (2008). Economic consequences of terrorism in developed and 
developing countries: An overview. In: Keefer, P., Loayza, N. (Eds), Terrorism, Economic 
Development, and Political Openness. Cambridge University Press: New York, NY, pp. 17-
47. 
Sandler, T., Tschirhart, J.T., Cauley, J. (1983). A theoretical analysis of transnational terrorism. 
American Political Science Review 77, 36-54. 
Scully, G.W. (2002). Economic freedom, government policy and the trade-off between equity 
and economic growth. Public Choice 113, 77-96. 
Solt, F. (2009). Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database. Social Science Quarterly 
90, 231-242. 
Thorbecke, E., Charumilind, C. (2002). Economic inequality and its socioeconomic impact. 
World Development 30, 1477-1495. 
United Nations Population Division (2015). 2015 Revision of World Population Prospects. The 
United Nations: New York, NY. 
Urdal, H. (2006). A Clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence. International 
Studies Quarterly 50, 607-629. 
Voigt, S. (2013). How (not) to measure institutions. Journal of Institutional Economics 9, 1-26. 
Walsh, J.I., Piazza, J.A. (2010). Why respecting physical integrity rights reduces terrorism. 
Comparative Political Studies 43, 551-577. 
Weil, D. (2013). Economic Growth. Routledge: London & New York. 
 29 
Wilkinson, R.G., Pickett, K.E. (2007). The problems of relative deprivation: Why some 
societies do better than others. Social Science & Medicine 65, 1965-1978. 
Wimmer, A., Cederman, L.E., Min, B. (2009). Ethnic politics and armed conflict. A 
configurational analysis of a new global dataset. American Sociological Review 74, 316-
337. 
World Bank (2014). World Development Indicators. The World Bank: Washington, DC. 
Wu, A.D., Zumbo, B.D. (2008). Understanding and using mediators and moderators. Social 
Indicators Research 87, 367-392. 
Yitzhaki, S. (1979). Relative deprivation and the Gini coefficient. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 93, 321-324. 
Young, J.K., Dugan, L. (2014). Survival of the fittest: Why terrorist groups endure. Perspectives 
on Terrorism 8, 2-23. 
  
 30 
 
Figure 1: Predictive Margins for Various Levels of Income Inequality 
 
 
Figure 2: Predictive Margins for Various Levels of Redistribution 
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Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Domestic Terrorist Incidents 3,011 12.80 48.75 0 1,252 
Domestic Terrorism Victims 3,011 60.03 252.89 0 5,216 
Income Inequality (Gini) 2,648 38.04 9.51 17.96 69.35 
Democracy 3,088 7.18 3.15 0.5 10 
Civil War 3,097 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Population Size (logged) 3,088 16.43 1.50 12.39 21.02 
Per Capita Income (logged) 3,014 8.08 1.65 4.73 11.36 
Government Consumption 2,977 15.35 5.60 2.05 50 
Excluded Population (logged) 2,730 1.80 1.47 0 4.50 
Economic Growth 3,031 3.66 4.39 -29.59 34.50 
Regime Durability 3,088 27.71 32.89 0 203 
Population Density (logged) 3,057 4.00 1.37 0.24 8.93 
Redistribution 2,648 1.24 0.28 0.91 2.28 
Theil Index (logged) 2,043 3.50 0.87 1.06 6.07 
Mature Cohort Size 3,088 0.29 0.06 0.17 0.44 
Value Added in Agriculture 2,819 12.78 12.13 0.04 60.28 
Rule of Law 3,088 6.22 2.45 0 10 
Corruption 3,088 4.76 2.26 0 10 
Physical Integrity Rights (Human Rights) 2,961 4.88 2.28 0 8 
Domestic Investment 2,936 21.66 6.33 -2.42 59.61 
Tertiary Schooling 2,231 30.81 24.58 0.12 113.98 
Table 1: Summary Statistics  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income Inequality t-1 0.071 0.071 0.067 0.075 0.066  
 (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.019)***  
Democracy t-1 0.075 0.075 0.079 0.044 0.116 0.099 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.058) (0.065)* (0.064) 
Civil War t-1 1.488 1.497 1.511 1.492 1.885 1.122 
 (0.273)*** (0.273)*** (0.269)*** (0.273)*** (0.272)*** (0.258)*** 
Population Size t-1 0.757 0.758 0.770 0.755 0.923 0.776 
 (0.100)*** (0.100)*** (0.097)*** (0.098)*** (0.117)*** (0.100)*** 
Per Capita Income t-1 -0.133 -0.132 -0.058 -0.054 -0.264 -0.165 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.165) (0.139) (0.174) (0.157) 
Government Consumption t-1 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.013 0.009 0.021 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.038) (0.027) 
Excluded Population t-1 0.441 0.441 0.453 0.419 0.719 0.597 
 (0.091)*** (0.091)*** (0.089)*** (0.090)*** (0.114)*** (0.095)*** 
Economic Growth t-1  0.007     
  (0.019)     
Regime Durability t-1   -0.004    
   (0.004)    
Population Density t-1    0.293   
    (0.102)***   
Theil Index t-1      0.422 
      (0.184)** 
Dependent Variable DA DA DA DA DV DA 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.107 0.108 0.111 0.058 0.105 
No. of Observations 2,317 2,313 2,317 2,301 2,317 1,775 
Notes: Constant not reported. Negative binomial regression results. DA = Number of domestic terrorist attacks. 
DV = Number of domestic terrorism victims. Robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Table 2: Domestic Terrorism and Income Inequality 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income Inequality t-1 0.067 0.051 0.120 0.042 0.069 0.072 
 (0.016)*** (0.014)*** (0.018)*** (0.010)*** (0.029)** (0.009)*** 
First-Stage Residual t-1 -0.055  -0.093  0.005  
 (0.028)**  (0.018)***  (0.034)  
Democracy t-1 0.130 0.117 0.003 0.056 0.073 0.072 
 (0.059)** (0.059)** (0.090) (0.037) (0.036)** (0.037)** 
Civil War t-1 1.471 1.468 1.693 1.778 1.475 1.467 
 (0.192)*** (0.192)*** (0.281)*** (0.290)*** (0.261)*** (0.245)*** 
Population Size t-1 0.926 0.947 0.760 0.717 0.749 0.749 
 (0.066)*** (0.064)*** (0.066)*** (0.072)*** (0.048)*** (0.048)*** 
Per Capita Income t-1 -0.067 -0.081 0.545 0.298 -0.144 -0.139 
 (0.115) (0.112) (0.077)*** (0.071)*** (0.074)* (0.067)** 
Government Consumption t-1 0.0049 0.048 -0.042 -0.046 0.005 0.004 
 (0.021)** (0.021)** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.013) (0.013) 
Excluded Population t-1 0.739 0.751 0.297 0.440 0.442 0.440 
 (0.067)*** (0.068)*** (0.092)*** (0.081)*** (0.058)*** (0.055)*** 
Estimation Technique CF-NBREG NBREG CF-NBREG NBREG CF-NBREG NBREG 
Instrument Income 
inequality t-10 
 Fat tails t-1  Value Added in 
Agriculture t-1 
 
First-Stage F-Statistic 119.05  36.57  11.72  
Endogeneity Test 3.97  26.66  0.02  
(Pr.>χ2) (0.04)**  (0.00)***  (0.89)  
Regional Dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,256 1,256 2,282 2,282 2,272 2,272 
Notes: Constant not reported. Dependent variable = Number of domestic terrorist attacks. NBREG= Negative binomial 
regression. CF-NBREG = Control-function negative binomial regression. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications) in 
parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Table 3: Endogeneity in the Inequality-Terrorism Nexus 
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Panel A: Effect of Inequality on Transmission Channels (OLS) 
Transmission Channel → Rule of Law Corruption Human 
Rights 
Domestic 
Investment 
Tertiary 
Education 
Income Inequality t-1 -0.058 0.050 -0.056 -0.006 -0.432 
 (0.025)** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.064) (0.189)** 
Panel B: Effect of Inequality on Transmission Channels (IV-OLS) 
Income Inequality t-1 -0.124 0.068 -0.149 0.138 -1.699 
 (0.051)** (0.032)** (0.045)*** (0.186) (0.492)*** 
First-Stage F-Statistic 215.81 215.81 214.27 206.47 112.78 
Hansen J-Statistic 2.18 1.43 0.61 1.34 8.22 
(Pr.>χ2) (0.14) (0.23) (0.43) (0.25) (0.00)*** 
Panel C: Effect of Transmission Variables on Domestic Terrorism (Negative Binomial Regression) 
Income Inequality t-1 0.056 0.061 0.031 0.069 0.074 
 (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)** (0.014)*** (0.019)*** 
Rule of Law  t-1 -0.210     
 (0.064)***     
Corruption  t-1  0.240    
  (0.062)***    
Human Rights  t-1   -0.490   
   (0.055)***   
Domestic Investment  t-1    -0.075  
    (0.021)***  
Tertiary Education  t-1     -0.003 
     (0.009) 
Notes: Constant not reported. Dependent variables = Transmission variables in Panels (A) and (B) and 
number of domestic terrorist attacks in Panel (C). Instruments for inequality in (B) = Mature cohort size 
and value added in agriculture. Hansen J-Statistic = Overidentification test. For all models the following 
covariates (all lagged) are included: democracy, civil war, population size per capita income, government 
consumption, excluded population as well as time and regional dummies. Country-clustered standard errors 
in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Table 4: Transmission Channels in the Inequality-Terrorism Nexus 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) 
Redistribution t-1 -1.920 -1.907 -1.832 -2.265 -1.371 
 (0.765)** (0.768)** (0.728)** (0.760)*** (0.968) 
Democracy t-1 0.098 0.098 0.104 0.070 0.138 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)* (0.058) (0.064)** 
Civil War t-1 1.462 1.468 1.500 1.462 1.820 
 (0.266)*** (0.265)*** (0.262)*** (0.260)*** (0.267)*** 
Population Size t-1 0.774 0.774 0.789 0.767 0.954 
 (0.108)*** (0.108)*** (0.100)*** (0.106)*** (0.121)*** 
Per Capita Income t-1 -0.022 -0.021 0.070 0.069 -0.244 
 (0.189) (0.189) (0.208) (0.189) (0.212) 
Government Consumption t-1 0.027 0.028 0.024 0.041 0.040 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.038) 
Excluded Population t-1 0.474 0.475 0.486 0.456 0.711 
 (0.088)*** (0.088)*** (0.088)*** (0.087)*** (0.109)*** 
Economic Growth t-1  0.003    
  (0.020)    
Regime Durability t-1   -0.006   
   (0.004)   
Population Density t-1    0.293  
    (0.109)***  
Dependent Variable DA DA DA DA DV 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.102 0.103 0.106 0.056 
No. of Observations 2,317 2,313 2,317 2,301 2,317 
Notes: Constant not reported. Negative binomial regression results. DA = Number of domestic 
terrorist attacks. DV = Number of domestic terrorism victims. Robust country-clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Table 5: Domestic Terrorism and Redistribution 
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Panel A: Effect of Inequality on Transmission Channels (OLS) 
Transmission Channels → Rule of Law Corruption Human 
Rights 
Domestic 
Investment 
Tertiary 
Education 
Redistribution t-1 1.387 -2.171 2.231 -4.310 5.706 
 (0.649)** (0.602)*** (0.488)*** (2.256)* (8.904) 
Panel B: Effect of Transmission Variables on Domestic Terrorism (Negative Binomial Regression) 
Redistribution t-1 -1.220 -1.404 -0.656 -2.299 -1.474 
 (0.705)* (0.748)* (0.657) (0.746)*** (0.796)* 
Rule of Law  t-1 -0.240     
 (0.065)***     
Corruption  t-1  0.252    
  (0.066)***    
Human Rights  t-1   -0.515   
   (0.051)***   
Domestic Investment  t-1    -0.086  
    (0.018)***  
Tertiary Education  t-1     -0.001 
     (0.010) 
Notes: Constant not reported. Dependent variables = Transmission variables in Panel (A) and number of 
domestic terrorist attacks in Panel (B). For all models the following covariates (all lagged) are included: 
democracy, civil war, population size per capita income, government consumption, excluded population 
as well as time and regional dummies. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Table 6: Transmission Channels in the Redistribution-Terrorism Nexus 
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Appendix A. List of Countries 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, 
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United 
States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Appendix B. Supplementary Tables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Income Inequality t-1 0.061 0.060 0.051 0.102 0.057 
 (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.025)*** (0.016)*** 
Democracy t-1 0.080 0.172 0.163 0.172 0.097 
 (0.058) (0.059)*** (0.059)*** (0.088)** (0.064) 
Civil War t-1 1.538 1.581 1.643 1.220 1.468 
 (0.261)*** (0.313)*** (0.292)*** (0.318)*** (0.240)*** 
Population Size t-1 0.718 0.764 0.711 0.465 0.847 
 (0.106)*** (0.096)*** (0.102)*** (0.163)*** (0.093)*** 
Per Capita Income t-1 -0.107 -0.272 -0.210 -0.130 -0.134 
 (0.144) (0.133)** (0.146) (0.186) (0.144) 
Government Consumption t-1 -0.002 0.007 -0.001 -0.012 0.010 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.042) (0.029) 
Excluded Population t-1 0.372 0.495 0.423 0.420 0.522 
 (0.099)*** (0.089)*** (0.098)*** (0.118)*** (0.097)*** 
Sample No 
Western 
Europe 
No South 
America 
No 
Western 
Europe 
and South 
America 
Cold War 
Era (1984-
1992) 
Post-Cold 
War Era 
(1993-
2012) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.110 0.105 0.089 0.122 
No. of Observations 1,891 2,059 1,633 578 1,739 
Notes: Constant not reported. Negative binomial regression results. Dependent variable: Number 
of domestic terrorist incidents. Robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Supplementary Table 1: Domestic Terrorism and Income Inequality (Sub-Samples) 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
Income Inequality t-10 0.714   
 (0.065)***   
Fat Tails t-1  -93.492  
  (15.461)***  
Value Added in Agriculture t-1   -0.381 
   (0.111)*** 
Democracy t-1 -0.192 0.673 0.161 
 (0.197) (0.215)*** (0.204) 
Civil War t-1 0.911 0.684 1.632 
 (0.725) (1.432) (1.533) 
Population Size t-1 0.279 0.010 0.015 
 (0.245) (0.445) (0.493) 
Per Capita Income t-1 0.150 -0.424 -3.264 
 (0.431) (0.554) (0.767)*** 
Government Consumption t-1 0.030 -0.134 0.001 
 (0.074) (0.130) (0.115) 
Excluded Population t-1 0.330 0.978 0.682 
 (0.279) (0.356)*** (0.393)* 
Regional Dummies Yes No Yes 
Time Dummies Yes No Yes 
R2 0.849 0.461 0.654 
No. of Observations 1,256 2,324 2,313 
Notes: Constant not reported. OLS regression results. Dependent 
variable: Income inequality (Gini coefficient). Robust country-clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Supplementary Table 2: First-Stage Regression Results 
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Mediator (M) Inequality → 
Mediator 
Mediator → 
Terrorism 
Percent Mediated 
Rule of Law -0.052 
(0.022)** 
-0.201 
(0.071)*** 
16.6% 
Corruption 0.050 
(0.014)*** 
0.270 
(0.060)*** 
18.9% 
Physical Integrity Rights -0.054 
(0.013)*** 
-0.518 
(0.050)*** 
52.4% 
Domestic Investment -0.005 
(0.063) 
-0.072 
(0.020)*** 
n/a 
Tertiary Scholl Enrollment -0.266 
(0.187) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
n/a 
Notes: For all models and tests the following covariates (all lagged) are included: 
democracy, civil war, population size per capita income, government consumption, 
ethnic tensions (ICRG data) as well as time and regional dummies. Country-
clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Supplementary Table 3: Mediation Analysis for Inequality-Terrorism Nexus 
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Mediator (M) Redistribution 
→ Mediator 
Mediator → 
Terrorism 
Percent Mediated 
Rule of Law 1.474 
(0.594)** 
0.235 
(0.068)*** 
26.3% 
Corruption -1.856 
(0.572)*** 
0.287 
(0.065)*** 
28.8% 
Physical Integrity Rights 2.304 
(0.476)*** 
-0.542 
(0.046)*** 
76.1% 
Domestic Investment -5.361 
(2.185)** 
-0.087 
(0.018)*** 
17.5% 
Tertiary Scholl Enrollment 1.485 
(8.652) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
n/a 
Notes: For all models and tests the following covariates (all lagged) are included: 
democracy, civil war, population size per capita income, government consumption, 
ethnic tensions (ICRG data) as well as time and regional dummies. Country-
clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Supplementary Table 4: Mediation Analysis for Redistribution-Terrorism Nexus 
